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The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination
and the American Exclusionary Rule:
A Societal Prohibition Versus an
Affirmative Individual Right
Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus
If. . . you establish everything according to the laws of the
Torah . . . and act only in accordance with how the Torah
punished . ... the result would be that world society would
perish, for we would need witnesses and forewarning ....
The result would be that the world would be desolate ....
Rabbi Shlomo ben Aderet (Rashba).
"These technicalities are basic to the kind of society we are."
William J. Brennan, Jr. on the Bill of Rights.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
In responding to yet another cry from the American press that the Fourth
Amendment's Exclusionary Rule was a technicality that allows criminals to go
free, Justice Brennan exclaimed:
Honestly, you in the media ought to be ashamed of yourselves
to call the provisions of the Bill of Rights 'technicalities.'
They're not. They're very basic to our existence as the kind
of society we are. We are what we are because of those guar-
antees, and this Court exists to see that those guarantees are
faithfully enforced. They are not technicalities! And no mat-
ter how awful may be the one who is the beneficiary time and
time again, guarantees have to be sustained, even though the
immediate result is to help some very unpleasant person.
Those 'technicalities' are there to protect all of us.
3
1. Aaron M. Schreiber, The Jurisprudence of Dealing with Unsatisfactory Fundamental
Law: A Comparative Glance at the Different Approaches in Medieval Criminal Law, Jewish
Law and the United States Supreme Court, 11 PACE L. REv. 535, 548 & nn.89 &-90 (1991)
(quoting Rashba in 3 RESPONSA RASHBA No. 393 & Trans. Of a Responsum of Rabbi Shlomo
ben Aderet, published by Kaufman in 8 JEWISH Q. REV. 228 (1895)).
2. Nat Hentoff, quoting Justice Brennan, Search and Seizure: Fragile Liberty in REASON
& PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 143 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard
Schwartz eds., 1997).
3. Id. at 147.
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Justice Brennan was passionate about protecting the rights of individuals.
He saw the Bill of Rights, most notably the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ments to the Constitution, as providing the individual with a shield of protec-
tion against the power of the government. These Amendments were
specifically adopted to guard against the particular evils of unjustified govern-
ment intrusions upon individual liberty, privacy, and property by the arbitrary
and excessive abuse of power. Only a faithful and diligent watch could pro-
tect these fundamental rights from those who would willingly sacrifice them
for the temporal gains of efficient law enforcement and the promotion of so-
cial order.4 Hence, the "guarantees" of the Bill of Rights were not mere tech-
nicalities but were themselves the source of fundamental individual liberties. 5
Justice Brennan recognized the inherent tension in American society between
individual liberties and community safety and the concomitant need to be vigi-
lant in protecting the rights of the individual from the power of the govern-
ment. He found such protection in the Exclusionary Rule to the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments. But this protection was far from absolute. Rather, it
was subject to numerous exceptions and with each exception, the protection it
afforded the individual was in danger of further erosion. In contrast, Jewish
law would seem to provide just such an absolute protection. Where what is
lacking in American law is a coherent approach that affords consistent protec-
tion to the individual from the state, at least in the exercise of its law enforce-
ment powers in seeking a confession of guilt, "[t]he Talmudic rule against
confessions, with its . .. absolute bar in all criminal (and quasi-criminal)
cases, ... ." would appear to provide "just such a unitary approach."
'6
Is it possible, therefore, to conceive of the Talmudic rule against self-
incrimination as the ultimate "Exclusionary Rule?" Would Justice Brennan
consider it a true safeguard of individual liberty against the power of the State?
Or is the Talmudic prohibition really the tool of the society to be used to
protect it from the transgressions of the individual?
In seeking answers to these questions, this paper will compare the Tal-
mudic rule against self-incrimination to the American Exclusionary Rule for
the Fifth Amendment. It will contrast the Talmudic principle that no man may
render himself an evil person with the American privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. In discussing the Talmudic prohibition against confessions in criminal
cases, I will trace its Biblical and Mishnaic origins and consider its scope,
4. William J. Brennan, Jr., My Life on the Court, supra note 2, at 21. "Continuous hard
work is needed if we are to realize the true potential of our Constitution and its Bill of Rights.
To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, eternal vigilance is the price of liberty and dignity - two of
the true measures of freedom."
5. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). The Court opined
that the Fourth Amendment would be reduced to a mere "form of words" if the Court did not
prohibit the use of evidence obtained from an illegal search and seizure "at all," in addition to
prohibiting its use before the Court.
6. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule
Against Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955, 964 (1988).
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exceptions, and rationale. In considering the Exclusionary Rule to the Fifth
Amendment, I will assess the justifications for the Rule and evaluate its
exceptions.
Finally, I will suggest that while Justice Brennan would no doubt have
great admiration for the Talmudic prohibition against self-incrimination, it is
likely that he would not consider it as protective of the liberty of the individual
as the Bill of Rights. 7 For while the Talmudic rule and the American rule
appear to be strikingly similar, they are in fact fundamentally different. The
Talmudic rule operates as a monolithic, societal prohibition whereas the
American rule is an affirmative, individual right. The consequences that flow
from this essential distinction make all the difference.
II. Tim TALMUDIC RULE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
As a general rule, Jewish law forbids the use of any self-incriminating
testimony, whether given voluntarily or elicited by official interrogation. 8 The
Biblical foundation for the rule is to be found in two sources. According to
Deuteronomy 19:15: "One witness shall not rise up against a man for any
iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sinneth; at the mouth of two wit-
nesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall a matter be established." 9
This pentateuchal requirement of two witnesses constitutes the exclusive
method for determining guilt in criminal proceedings. It would seem, how-
ever, that the verse allows for the possibility that a confessing defendant could
be counted as one of the two witnesses required to convict. But that possibil-
ity is ruled out in another Biblical source. Deuteronomy 24:16, the other Bib-
lical foundation for the Talmudic prohibition against confessions provides:
"The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children
be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own
sin."' 0
7. Justice Brennan commented that "[a]s I have said many times and in many ways, our
Constitution is a charter of human rights and human dignity. It is a bold commitment by a
people to the ideal of dignity protected through law." Supra note 4, at 18.
8. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 974.
9. There are two other Scriptural verses which deal with the two-witness requirement.
First, Numbers 35:30 provides: "Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be slain at the
mouth of witnesses; but one witness shall not testify against any person that he die." Second,
Deuteronomy 17:6 states: "At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is to
die be put to death; at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death." These two verses
were directed specifically to capital cases. Id. at 975 & n.75. (As explained in n.75 all Biblical
translations and texts are taken from the Soncino Press edition entitled THE PENTATEUCH AND
HAFroRAHs (J. Hertz, 2d ed., 1960)).
10. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 976. The authors cite in n.77 the Rashi Com-
mentary on Chumash, Deuteronomy 24:16, at 120. The commentary notes: "'Fathers shall not
be put to death' - i.e. by the evidence of their children. But if you say it means 'for the sin of
their children', then it would be redundant for it goes on to state 'every man shall be put to death
for his own sin' . . . . Like Rashi's interpretation, the discussion of this verse in the Gemara
shows the dangers of Biblical literalism. "The Gemara questions: 'Whence is this law [prohib-
iting testimony of kinsmen] derived? - From what our Rabbis taught: The fathers shall not be
20021
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Once again, a literal reading of this passage would seem to be concerned
solely with preventing conviction based on consanguinity. Rashi tells us that
the Sages, on the authority of the oral tradition, interpreted the law as also
relating to the exclusion of testimony by relatives.I The Rabbis then went on
to inquire, "who is closer to a person than himself?" They concluded that the
accused was his own kinsman and that his confession was precluded in crimi-
nal matters.1
2
These two passages from Deuteronomy, when taken together, provide a
Scriptural basis for the proposition that the testimony of the accused could not
be included in determining whether there were the prescribed number of wit-
nesses needed to establish guilt. 13 Thus, even if there was one witness or other
evidence corroborative of the defendant's guilt, his confession remained inad-
missible. The confession, if indeed there was one, was simply irrelevant.
14
The rule against self-incrimination is deduced rather than explicitly stated
in the Torah. It is derived from the broad, general requirement of two wit-
nesses to convict and the specific prohibition against testimony by kinsman.
One might well ask why the bar against confessions was left to be deduced
rather than stated explicitly. It has been suggested that the answer to this ques-
tion is "ultimately unknowable" and simply "part of the larger question of the
basis for the division between written and oral law in Judaism."1 5 Perhaps, the
more appropriate question to ask might be what the two-witness rule, as inter-
preted by the rabbis, tells us about society's expectations of its members' obli-
gations in the criminal process. Using the two-witness rule, the Sages made it
extremely, if not practically impossible, to convict anyone of a crime.1 6 It can
put to death for. . .the children. What does this teach? Is it that fathers shall not be executed
for sins committed by their children and vice versa? But is it not already explicitly stated, Every
man shall be put to death for his own sin? Hence, Fathers shall not be put to death on account
of [their] children, must mean, fathers shall not be put to death on the testimony of their sons
and similarly, and sons shall not be put to death on account of fathers, means, nor sons on the
testimony of their fathers.' (quoting Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 27b, (I. Epstein ed., He-
brew-English ed., 1960)) [hereinafter "B. Talmud"] Id. n.77.
11. Id. at 976.
12. Id. The authors quote in n. 165 the passage from Rashi: "'Raba said' - A person is not
disqualified from testifying by his own admission, for a person is related to himself. Therefore,
a person cannot make himself a 'rasha.' That is to say, regarding testimony about himself he
does not become a 'rasha,' for indeed the Torah disqualified a relative from testifying. And the
sodomizer is killed, for we partition the statement, and we believe him about the confederate,
and we do not believe him about himself to disqualify him from testifying." (quoted from B.
Talmud, Sanhedrin 9b (Rashi commentary)).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 977 & n.80.
15. Id. at 978.
16. Id. at 980. Penal laws were strictly construed. There was a requirement of two wit-
nesses to convict; these witnesses had to be qualified, meaning that they had to be adult men
with no interest in the outcome who were not themselves incompetent or evil and were not
related to the defendant or to each other. Moreover, the witnesses had to give advance warning
to the suspect that he was about to commit a punishable offense and then observe that the




be argued that the practical result of this rule is an affirmation of the sanctity
of each individual's life, no matter how evil his conduct might appear.'
7
In addition, the connection between the kinsmen testimonial rule and the
prohibition against self-incrimination may be deduced to yield a fundamental
rule defining the individual's relationship to the state. According to Irene and
Yale Rosenberg, while it "may appear paradoxical that the prohibition, whose
nature is quintessentially individualistic, effectively permitting the accused to
hold the state at bar unless it can convict by extrinsic evidence, should be
inferred in part from a doctrine based on family relationships," the connection
between family and individual rights may be a way
of asserting that the primary unit of the social order is the
family, not the state, or that liberty for the person can best be
achieved through the family network. Creating a testimonial
bar for kinsmen may have been a way of preserving the pri-
vacy interests of the family and its constituent members
against governmental invasion.18
In their analysis of the derivation of the prohibition against self-inculpa-
tory statements from the family-based kinsman rule, the Rosenbergs may well
have captured the essential paradox surrounding the relationship of the indi-
vidual to the society. For while the Torah teaches that a person is unique, 19 he
or she is not an isolated individual but rather a link to those who have come
before and to those who are to follow. The individual is caught, as it were, in
the web of family connections. The individual's relationship to the state,
therefore, is through his family. Is it possible that the intended beneficiary of
the Talmudic prohibition is the family and not the individual, but that the only
means to accomplish this end is through the individual? If, as the Rosenbergs
suggest, the "connection here between family and individual rights may be a
way of asserting that the primary unit of the social order is the family, and not
the state, or that liberty for the person can best be achieved through the family
network,"20 then the testimonial bar is a means of preserving the privacy inter-
ests of the family as the primary social unit against governmental invasion,
and not a means of preserving the privacy of its individual members.
A. Civil and Criminal Admissions
Jewish law can be seen as divided into two parts: civil and criminal. 21 In
criminal law, which includes fines and penalties, "the basic principle is that a
man's statements regarding himself cannot be used to bring about his convic-
17. Id. at 980.
18. Id. at 982-83.
19. Id. at 982. (citing in n.98, B. Talmud, Sanhedrin 37a: "Whoever saves one life, it is as
if he has saved the whole world.").
20. Id.
21. AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SELF-INCRIMINATION IN JEWISH LAW 103 (1970).
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tion and punishment (by death, lashes or fines) and to disqualify him from
acting as a witness or from taking an oath in court." 22 In civil law, the basic
principle is that a man's admission of an obligation is equivalent to the testi-
mony of one hundred witnesses.2 3 The effect of confessions in civil cases
involving monetary compensation was, therefore, to render the defendant ab-
solutely liable whereas with regard to penalties the effect was quite the oppo-
site - to render the defendant immune from liability for the fine.
This differing treatment of confessions emerged during the Mishnaic era.
Interestingly, it is through the framework of debates concerning civil litigation
that the bar against self-incrimination in criminal cases was affirmed. One
example of this indirect confirmation of the rule barring admissions in crimi-
nal matters appears in an early Mishnaic discussion of admissions in cases
involving fines. In such proceedings, a defendant's confession in an action
against a thief to recover a multiple of the value of the stolen goods rendered
the defendant immune from liability for the fine. 24 By contrast, an admission
of indebtedness in a civil monetary proceeding was treated as a binding con-
cession of liability, the maxim being that "a man's admission of his own liabil-
ity is equivalent to one hundred witnesses.
'25
American law, on the other hand, does not distinguish between "civil"
and "criminal" confessions. While the Fifth Amendment ostensibly refers to a
"criminal case," the privilege against self-incrimination nonetheless may be
invoked in any proceeding, civil or criminal, if the evidence that would be
produced there might incriminate the speaker in a future criminal proceed-
ing.26 It would appear, therefore, that the Talmudic prohibition is not as abso-
lute a bar against confession as first supposed, nor is it necessarily the "unitary
approach" some would suggest. 27 Instead, by treating confessions differently
22. Id.
23. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6 (citing in n. 120, THE TOSEFrA, Bava Mezia 1:10,
at 74-75: "A man's admission of his own liability is equivalent to one hundred witnesses.").
24. Id. (citing in n.119, B. Talmud, Kethuboth 41a: "This is the general rule: whosoever
must pay more than the cost of damage done does not pay on his own admission." The rationale
of this rule is that any person who has committed an act punishable by fine is not obligated to
pay the fine if he confessed to such misconduct, although he remains liable for any prescribed
compensatory damages.).
25. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 21, at 79. Kirschenbaum relates the suggestions of a num-
ber of rabbinical scholars as to how the rule that a man's admission of liability had the power of
one hundred witnesses in monetary matters may be understood. According to Rabbi ibn Leb,
the credibility of the confessing litigant is not at issue: his confession is construed as a manifes-
tation of willingness to obligate himself to pay the other party the specific sum to which he has
"confessed," almost as if he were paying a debt or giving a gift. R. Aryeh Leib HaKohen argues
against this position and concludes: "the power of a man's admission of liability is an indepen-
dent, axiomatic principle of Jewish law; just as the Torah has commanded any Jewish tribunal to
accept as final and as definitive the testimony of two unrelated, unbiased and uncorrupted eye-
witnesses, so must it accept and grant similar status to the self-admitted liability of a litigant."
26. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
27. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 964.
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based on whether it is a civil or criminal matter, a "confessing" defendant
under Jewish law meets with different results.
An explanation for these differing results is that the court is acting in a
different capacity in civil and criminal proceedings. A defendant is allowed to
testify against himself in a civil matter involving mere monetary restitution
because the court is making an objective decision about entitlement to prop-
erty.28 In this case, the court is merely confirming the existence of the debt
that was based on the acts of the parties themselves. The obligation was in-
cuffed when the defendant borrowed money from the plaintiff. A court order
requiring payment of this pre-existing liability on the basis of an admission is
not punishment. It is simply recognition of what the defendant owes.
29
In criminal proceedings, however, the court is creating liability where
none previously existed. In this case, the defendant's confession could not be
received into evidence. The effect of confessions in cases involving fines or
penalties was to exempt the defendant from liability for the fine. In effect, the
prohibition against inculpatory statements with respect to fines conferred im-
munity on the confessing defendant.
B. Disqualification of Witnesses
The texts from Mishnaic times, therefore, treated confessions either in the
context of their admissibility or to the extent to which they conferred immu-
nity. The Gemara's treatment of self-incrimination offered a different per-
spective, that of disqualification of witnesses.
Jewish law considers a person guilty of certain offenses a "rasha," or
"wicked person" and bars him from testifying as a witness. 30 In criminal
cases, there is no question of using the defendant's confession to convict him.
The accused who confesses simply cannot be found guilty on that basis. 31 The
28. The ex-proprietary powers of the sages in monetary matters was plenary. "[T]he judge
may at all times expropriate money from its owner, destroy it, or give it away, disposing of it in
any way which in his judgment will halt the breakdown of religion, repair its breaches, or bring
to terms the defier of the Law. Thus it is written in the Book of Ezra: 'Whosoever come not
within three days, according to the counsel of the princes and the elders, all his substance
should be forfeited.' From this we infer that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to confis-
cate property." The Code of Maimonides, Judges, Sanhedrin 24:6, (hereinafter "Maimonides").
29. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 21, at 38. "[I]n simple monetary matters it was the original
act of the (losing) litigant which created his (presently adjudged) liability .. " Kirschenbaum
traces the scriptural authority for these rules regarding money matters to the following: (1) For
the inability of admission of guilt to bring about liability to monetary fines, the Talmud finds
scriptural support from Exodus 22:8, "[H]e whom the judges shall condemn shall pay double,"
suggesting that only he whom the judges condemned was to be penalized; he who condemns
himself cannot be so penalized; (2) For the rule that in cases involving simple monetary restitu-
tion a man's own admission of guilt has the power of one hundred witnesses, the Talmud is
silent. Rashi on Qiddushin 65b implies it from Exodus 22:8.
30. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6. (Citing in n. 162, Exodus 23: 1, "put not thy hand
with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness." On this scriptural basis, persons guilty of Bibli-
cal offenses such as robbery are disqualified as witnesses.).
31. Id. at 988.
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question of disqualifying his testimony, however, is different: the issue is
whether by confessing to a crime, a person renders himself a rasha who may
not act as a witness at trial. Thus, in this instance, disqualification and not
conviction is at stake.
32
The Gemara Sages debated this question whether a person whose testi-
mony would be self-incriminating is disqualified from serving as a witness. In
the Sanhedrin of the Talmud, Rabbi Joseph said:
If a man says that so-and-so committed sodomy with him for-
cibly, he himself with another witness can combine to testify
to this crime. If, however, he admits that he acceded to the
act, he is a rasha, a wicked man disqualified from acting as a
witness, since the Torah says: 'Put not thy hand with the
wicked to be an unrighteous witness.'
33
Raba, however, said: "Every man is considered a kinsman unto himself,
and no one can render himself a rasha." 3
4
In translating this passage to read that "no man may render himself a
rasha," as opposed to the more usual translation, "no man may incriminate
himself," the intent is to "emphasize the particular nuance that the Amoraim
felt when they used the term."' 35 When R. Joseph calls the confessed
sodomizer a "rasha," he is using the term technically, as the "term for one
whose criminal, sinful or immoral act has disqualified him from acting as a
witness in a Jewish court."' 36 The point that Raba is making is "that no man
can render himself disqualified to act as a witness in court on the basis of his
own confession to any criminal, sinful or immoral act that would so disqualify
him."37
Raba's rule has been seen to have its practical advantages. Since acting
as a witness was a major responsibility, 38 such responsibility could be avoided
by confessing to some violation of the law which would disqualify the confes-
sant by branding him a rasha. Raba's rule would eliminate this escape. Raba
would allow the offender to testify but only as to his accomplice's acts and not
his own. Because the witness is not testifying as to his own misconduct, he
has not rendered himself an evil person and he is, therefore, not disqualified
from testifying.39 By rejecting his voluntary statement of self-incrimination, a
32. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 21, at 51.
33. Id. at 50.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 51.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. In capital cases, witnesses were expected to initiate the execution of the defendant who
was found guilty on the basis of their testimony. Id. (citing Deuteronomy 17:7).
39. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1000. The passage from Rashi is as follows:
Raba said: A person is not disqualified from testifying by his own admission, for a person is
related to himself. Therefore, a person cannot make himself a 'rasha,' that is to say, regarding
testimony about himself he does not become a 'rasha,' for indeed the Torah disqualified a
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reluctant person could be compelled to perform his duty as a witness. Appar-
ently, while Rabbi Joseph would disqualify the witness based on his incrimi-
nating statement, Raba would bifurcate his evidence, allowing the witness to
testify but accepting that portion implicating the accused.
40
Other Talmudic debates support this view that Rabbi Joseph would dis-
qualify the witnesses while Raba would bifurcate their testimony. The Ge-
mara Sages, in commenting on a Mishnaic discussion of the types of persons
who are disqualified as witnesses said that both lenders and borrowers of
money with interest are precluded from testifying. The Gemara describes this
case:
Two witnesses testified against Bar Binithus. One said, 'He
lent money on interest in my presence.' The other said, 'He
lent me money on interest.' [In consequence,] Raba disquali-
fied Bar Binithus [from acting as witness]. But did not Raba
himself rule: A borrower on interest is unfit to act as witness?
Consequently he is a transgressor, and the Torah said: Do not
accept the wicked as witness? - Raba here acted in accor-
dance with another principle of his. For Raba said: Every
man is a relative in respect to himself, and no man can incrim-
inate himself.
4'
Bar Binithus could be convicted of lending money on interest - but only
on the basis of testimony from two competent witnesses. In this case, how-
ever, the testimony of the second witness disclosed that he himself was a rasha
because he had violated prohibition against borrowing money on interest and
if such testimony were excluded, Bar Binithus could be neither convicted nor
disqualified as a witness. Because Bar Binithus was disqualified, it is evident
that he had been convicted and that to secure conviction, Raba must have used
the bifurcation theory, accepting the witness's testimony that Bar Binithus had
lent money on interest, but rejecting that portion of the testimony that the loan
was to the witness himself.
42
An interesting result of Raba's bifurcation theory, which insures that a
reluctant person is compelled to perform his duty as a witness, might be to
protect the society. By failing to hold that self-incriminating statements dis-
qualified a witness, Raba would allow use of this individual's statements to
relative from testifying. And the sodomizer is killed, for we partition the statement, and we
believe him about his confederate, and we do not believe him about himself to disqualify him
from testifying. Id. n.165.
40. Id. at 1001.
41. Id. (quoting B. Talmud, Sanhedrin 25a).
42. Id. at 1002. See also Maimonides, Judges, Evidence 12:2, at 108. Maimonides writes:
[I]f A testifies that B loaned money on interest, and C testifies, 'He [B made a loan to me on
interest,' B is disqualified on the evidence of A and C. As to C, though he admits that he
contracted a loan on interest, he cannot incriminate himself. He is accounted trustworthy with
regard to B, but not with regard to himself.
2002]
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catch a criminal. 43 If the basis of the Talmudic prohibition against self-incrim-
ination is seen as a protection of the individual for the larger purpose of bene-
fiting the society, then by bifurcating testimony, the society is simultaneously
protected from the corruption or impurities of the individual whose testimony
would render him a "rasha" and the "guilty" person against whom the testi-
mony is used to convict.
Whatever the result, the issue in this case is the "disqualification" of testi-
mony and not the use of such testimony to "convict" the witness. While Rabbi
Joseph and Raba differ about whether a self-incriminating statement requires
disqualification of the witness, "neither of these Gemara Sages is suggesting
that a confession may be used to convict the declarant of any crime. Plainly,
under Talmudic law, it may not."44
C. The Scope of the Talmudic Prohibition
The Talmudic rule against self-incrimination was neither all encompass-
ing nor inflexible. As discussed, the prohibition was completely inapplicable
in purely civil monetary cases. In addition, Talmudic law may have made the
prohibition against self-incrimination inapplicable even in criminal cases. The
rabbinical courts were empowered to suspend certain procedural guarantees
and, in certain situations, they could prescribe punishments not ordinarily al-
lowed by law. These powers existed in two settings. First, the rabbinical
courts could take such action in times of emergency, when there was deemed
to be a substantial threat to the community as a whole. 45 An example of such
a threat would be where there was widespread public disregard for the law
resulting in general misconduct and violence. Faced with such emergency
conditions, the rabbis were authorized to dispense with evidentiary safeguards,
43. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1009. The authors put it quite colorfully:
"Raba's bifurcation approach in Sanhedrin 9b would prevent an accomplice from torpedoing the
case against the defendant simply by coming forward to testify as to both his own criminal
conduct and that of the accused." In further explication of Raba's bifurcation theory, they posit
that Raba's theory would "require the trier of fact to accept the testimony of the alleged accom-
plice as to his confederate's guilt, provided that the accomplice was found otherwise qualified to
be a witness. It does, however, assure that cases will not be automatically dismissed when there
are only two witnesses to the act, including the accomplice." Id. at 1014-15.
44. Id. at 1006. Raba's bifurcation theory ultimately prevailed. For when the Talmud itself
does not decide a particular controversy between Gemara Sages, it provides that the law is in
accord with a later opinion except when a disciple disagrees with his teacher. This rule only
applied up to the generation of Raba. From Raba's time forward, the later opinion prevails,
even in the case of a student who challenges his teacher. Id. at 1016-17.
45. "[T]he court, even if it be inferior ... is authorized to dispense for a time even with
these measures. For these decrees are not to be invested with greater stringency than the com-
mands of the Torah itself, which any court has the right to suspend as an emergency measure.
Thus the court may inflict flagellation and other punishments, even in cases where such penal-
ties are not warranted by the law, if in its opinion, religion will thereby be strengthened and
safeguarded and the people will be restrained from disregarding the words of the Torah. It must
not, however, establish the measure to which it resorts as a law binding upon succeeding gener-
ations, declaring, 'This is the law."' Maimonides, Judges, Rebels, 2:4.
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including the prohibition against self-incrimination and the need for two wit-
nesses, and could dispense punishments, including the death penalty, that were
not otherwise prescribed for such misconduct.
46
The exercise of emergency authority was circumscribed; it was of limited
duration and scope. Maimonides noted that "whatever measure [the court]
adopts is only a temporary one and does not acquire the force of a law, binding
for all time to come."9
47
The second situation in which the rabbinical courts were empowered to
suspend procedural safeguards was in specified cases involving murderers and
certain repeat offenders. Two Mishnahs are applicable to this exception.
They focus on the individual wrongdoer who may otherwise escape punish-
ment because of procedural defects. In both Mishnahs, the court is empow-
ered to imprison the wrongdoer, give him bread and water to shrink his
intestines, and then feed him barley bread "until his stomach bursts. '48 The
"barley bread" exception was applicable in two instances: first, in the case of
the habitual offender and second, in the case of one who commits murder in
the absence of witnesses. 49 In this instance, the disregard of procedural re-
quirements appears to have been limited to cases in which factual guilt was
obvious. 50 Whether the rule against self-incrimination was among the guaran-
tees suspended in these proceedings is not entirely clear.
5 '
For our purposes, the "emergency" authority of the courts is important
because it shows that the procedural safeguards in the Jewish criminal system
were not absolute, but instead, were subject to modification and even whole-
sale abandonment where appropriately justified. And the justification was al-
ways the same: to protect the society. In this effort, the court was empowered
to suspend Biblical laws safeguarding the rights of the individual if the stabil-
ity or safety of the society was at stake. Thus, the individual is subordinate to
46. B. Talmud, Sanhedrin 46a; R. Eliezer ben Jacob said: "I have heard that the Beth Din
may, [when necessary,] impose flagellation and pronounce [capital] sentences even where not
[warranted] by the Torah; yet not with the intention of disregarding the Torah but [on the con-
trary] in order to safeguard it. It once happened that a man rode a horse on the Sabbath in the
Greek period and he was brought before the court and stoned, not because he was liable thereto,
but because it was [practically] required by the times. Again it happened that a man once had
intercourse with his wife under a fig tree. He was brought before the Beth din and flogged, not
because he merited it, but because the times required it."
47. Maimonides, Judges, Sanhedrin 24:4, at 73.
48. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1022. The authors cite the two Mishnahs in
n.236: First: "He who was twice flagellated [for two transgressions, and then sinned again,] is
placed by Beth Din in a cell and fed with barley bread, until his stomach bursts." Second: "One
who commits murder without witnesses is placed in a cell and [forcibly] fed with bread of
adversity and water of affliction." (quoting Mishnah, Sanhedrin 9:5, at 396, reprinted in B.
Talmud, Sanhedrin 81b. (As noted in nn.48 & 236 Mishnah citations and translations are from
The Mishnah (H. Danby trans. 1933 and are accompanied by parallel citations to the page on
which the material appears in the B. Talmud).
49. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1022-24.
50. Id. at 1026-27.
51. Id. at 1027.
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the society and even the prohibitions that seem most protective of the individ-
ual in his relations with the state are subject to suspension when that society
needs protection from the individual.
In addition to the emergency authority of the rabbinical courts to suspend
the prohibition against confession, there was yet another forum in which the
prohibition was apparently inapplicable: the Jewish royal courts. 52 Joshua and
David both carried out ostensibly confession-based executions. 53 Maimonides
attempted to explain them either on the basis that they involved emergencies
or that they were permitted to be inflicted by state law by exercising their
royal prerogatives. Yet elsewhere, in describing the powers of royal courts,
Maimonides writes:
52. Maimonides, Judges, Sanhedrin 18:6, at 52-53; Kings and Wars 3:8-10, at 213-14.
53. In the book of Joshua, it is related that after the conquest of Jericho, Joshua declared the
city, its inhabitants and all the possessions therein herein, devoted to the Lord and forever
removed from secular use. (Leviticus 27:28-29). When Akhan ben Karmi secretly took from
the herein, the Israelites were punished by an unexpected defeat in battle. The Lord declared
that there is the curse of the herem in their midst and they must be tested until the culprit is
found and executed. The culprit was identified by means of some kind of lot cast before the
Holy Ark as each tribe and member therein was brought near. Joshua said to Akhan: "My son,
give, I pray thee, glory to the Lord, God of Israel, and make confession unto Him and tell me
now what thou hast done; hide nothing from me." Akhan answered Joshua: "Of a truth I have
sinned against the Lord, the God of Israel, and thus and thus have I done .. " And Akhan
related what he had done and Joshua sent messengers to the tent and found the silver and gold
that Akhan had hidden there. (Joshua 7:19-21). In punishment, Akhan and all that belonged to
him were stoned to death and burned to destruction and buried under stones. "And the Lord
turned from the fierceness of His anger." (7:19-21). Here, then, is a scriptural account of
acceptance of a criminal confession. Joshua's acceptance of the criminal confession is in con-
flict with the normative rabbinical criminal procedure which rests exclusively on the testimony
of two eyewitnesses. The Talmudic rabbis looked upon Joshua's "action with regard to Akhan
... as an act of emergency, due to extraordinary circumstances - the violation of the herem
and the challenge to the authenticity of the instrument whereby the Land would be divided -
which may never be utilized as a precedent." KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 21, at 66. Kirschen-
baum posits, on the other hand, that "it is clear that the crucial source of conviction was the Lot"
and not the confession. Id. at 28. Joshua's desire that Akhan confess goes to the concept of
atonement. "Biblical law asked the criminal who had been condemned to death to make a
public confession of his sin and to praise God. Although not necessary for conviction, it was
necessary for atonement, for the penitential confession transformed the execution from mere
punishment to expiation." Id. at 30.
In the first chapter of Second Samuel, the story is told of the Amalekite stranger who came
from the camp of the defeated Israelites and informed David of the deaths of Saul and Jonathan.
When asked by David how he came to know of their deaths, the man answered that at the
request of the wounded king, "I stood beside him, and slew him .... (1:10). David subse-
quently put the young man on trial and had him executed. David said: "Thy blood be upon thy
head for thy mouth hath testified against thee saying: 'I have slain the Lord's anointed."' (1:13-
16). Two explanations are offered for David's action: Maimonides regards it as an emergency
act but does not specify the emergency. Id. at 66. Levi Gersonides suggests that the emergency
faced by David was that the people should not take regicide lightly - that the situation created
by the Amalekite stranger represented a clear and present danger to the stability of David's rule
and one which warranted the invocation of emergency measures. Id. at 67. A second interpre-
tation given by Maimonides is that Joshua and David were exercising their royal prerogatives.
This system of the secular law of the king was recognized by Jewish law. Id. at 67-68.
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If a person kills another and there is no clear evidence, or if no
warning has been given him, or there is only one witness, or if
one kills accidentally a person whom he hated, the king may,
if the exigency of the hour demands it, put him to death in
order to insure the stability of the social order. He may put to
death many offenders in one day, hang them, and suffer them
to be hanging for a long time so as to put fear in the hearts of
others and break the power of the wicked.
54
Whatever the authority in Jewish law, whether the rabbinical court or the
secular law of the king, the ability to suspend the individual's rights in favor of
the larger society graphically illustrates the major difference between the
American and Jewish legal systems. While American law focuses on the indi-
vidual, both in granting rights and in imposing responsibilities, Jewish law
focuses on the community and the individual's commitment to the
community.
55
D. The Rationale for the Talmudic Prohibition
In examining the Talmudic rule against self-incrimination, the question
naturally arises as to why Jewish law would embrace a rule that denied use of
an individual's incriminating statement to secure conviction. The Biblical re-
quirement that guilt be established through two or more witnesses need not
have precluded the admissibility of the defendant's admission. Nor did the
Scriptural prohibition against the testimony of kinsmen require that the ac-
cused be included in that category.
56
The Talmudic scholars gave no specific indication of its underlying ratio-
nale.57 Nonetheless, scholars and commentators have offered their explana-
tions for the inadmissibility of self-incriminating statements. Maimonides
suggested the possibility that the defendant might have been "confused in
mind" when he made the confession, asserting either as an example of such
confusion or as a separate basis, that an innocent person might confess because
he was suicidal. 58 Maimonides' ultimate conclusion, however, was that the
prohibition was a divine decree.
54. Maimonides, Judges, Kings and Wars 3:10, at 214.
55. Beth C. Miller, A Comparison of American and Jewish Legal Views on Rape, 5 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 182, 183-84 (1996).
56. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1027.
57. For the orthodox Jew, the question of rationale is not an issue. It is accepted on faith.
Jewish law embodies an absolute prohibition against the use of confessions in criminal and
quasi-criminal cases because God has so decreed and the interpretations of the two-witness rule
and the kinsmen rule come from the oral law. Id. n.256.
58. Maimonides, Judges, Sanhedrin 18:6, at 52-53. "The Sanhedrin ... is not empowered
to inflict the penalty of death or of flagellation on the admission of the accused. For it is
possible that he was confused in mind when he made the confession. Perhaps he was one of
those who are in misery, bitter in soul, who long for death, thrust the sword into their bellies or
cast themselves down from the roofs. Perhaps this was the reason that prompted him to confess
2002]
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Conceivably, Maimonides may be explaining that because there are in-
stances of disturbed or suicidal individuals who have a compulsion to confess
falsely, "a divine decree in the form of a prophylactic rule prohibiting self-
incrimination in all cases was necessary." 59 While this rationale would seem
to raise only reliability concerns, I would propose that it is suggestive of a
comprehensive societal protection from the corruption of individuals; the soci-
ety is protected from the evils which might ensue from accepting confessions
from the mentally disturbed or those who would simply lie, whatever their
reason. Through the operation of the prohibition, the community is able to
fulfill its obligations to its members because there is an obligation of every
Jew to try to prevent others from violating a commandment. 60 Judaism
teaches that every Jew has some responsibility for the conduct of every other
Jew,61 thus, the community itself would be responsible if an individual were to
violate its laws. In accepting a false confession, the community would there-
fore be a participant in the individual's violation of a commandment.
Other suggested rationales for the prohibition include but are not limited
to the following: that confessions might lead to torture; that they were unrelia-
ble; that the prohibition is but "one strand of an entire fabric of protections
afforded the accused in the Jewish criminal justice process; 62 that the prohibi-
tion acts to "assure preservation of the spectrum of procedural and evidentiary
safeguards established by the Torah, [thus assuring] that no shortcuts would be
taken in the fact-finding process; ' 63 that since the prohibition is absolute, it
precludes waivers and "insures that all procedural protections are not merely
apparent, but real;" 64 fourth, "although a man's property was his own, his life
belonged to God" and to confess to a crime in a capital case "would be to
enable the accused to commit a form of suicide; '65 and that it "serves as a
to a crime that he had not committed, in order that he might be put to death. To sum up the
matter, the principle that no man is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a divine
decree."
59. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1034.
60. Steven F. Friedell, The "Different Voice" in Jewish Law: Some Parallels to a Feminist
Jurisprudence, 67 IND.L.J. 915, 942 (1992); B. Talmud, Shevuot 37a-b; see also B. Talmud,
Sanhedrin 27b; The expression used is that all Jews are sureties for one another.
61. Id.
62. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1027.
63. Id. at 1031.
64. Id. at 1032.
65. Id. at 1037. The authors cite the rationale offered by the Radbaz, a sixteenth century
Talmudic scholar and Kabbalist, in n.296: "[In the case of] one who comes to court and says,
'Punish me,' we do not punish him. And thus we say in Jewish law: a man may not make
himself a rasha [evil person]. The [suicide] rationale that our rabbi [Maimonides] gave [as a
basis for the prohibition against self-incrimination] does not apply [in the case of] lashes.
Therefore he [Maimonides] wrote ... that it is a divine decree, and we do not know the reason.
It is possible to look for a reason, [to wit:] Because a person's soul does not belong to him, but
is the possession of the Holy One Blessed Be He, as it is said, 'Behold, all souls are Mine.'
Ezekiel 18:4. Therefore, a person may not give a confession concerning something that is not
his, and [this is why] flogging is the same as killing [and included in the confession rule]. But
his money is his, and ... we say [in this context] that a party's confession is the equivalent of
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fence around the two-witness rule and other commandments relating to the
sanctity of human life."
'66
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The American counterpart to the Talmudic prohibition against self-in-
crimination is the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that no person shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.67 Born of the
concern that the people needed protection from the power of the government,
the Bill of Rights to the Constitution was adopted to safeguard individual
liberties.6
8
Particularly odious to the American Founding Fathers was the conviction
of an innocent person because of a "forced confession." Whether born of
the belief that compelled testimony was a means by which "New England
magistrates, who claimed divine authority, enforced compliance with an
established church" or a shield against the "evils that lurk[ed] in the shadows
of a new and untried sovereignty," 69 the Fifth Amendment privilege pro-
one hundred witnesses .... A man is not permitted to kill himself, and thus a man is not
permitted to confess that he committed a sin that would make him liable to death, because his
soul is not his own. And beside all this, I agree that it is a divine decree of the Master of the
World concerning which one must not speculate." Maimonides, Mishnah Torah, Hilchot San-
hedrin 18:6 (Radbaz commentary).
66. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1039. The argument is that even if confes-
sions were accepted in evidence only when corroborated, we might in time forget that our lives
are not our own to be given away freely and this might in turn lead to permitting confessions to
form the sole basis for conviction. Hence, the total exclusion of such self-incriminating state-
ments serves as a fence around the rule.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V, "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against [oneself] .... "
68. Dumas Malone, Jefferson, Hamilton, and the Constitution, in THOMAS JEFFERSON A
PROFILE 167 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1967). In discussing Jefferson's concerns about the new
Constitution, Malone stated that Jefferson believed that, "Individuals needed to be protected
against their rulers, against any rulers." This was the basis for the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
69. MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE 163-64 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed., 1992); see also
George Horowitz, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination - How Did It Originate? 31
TEMP.L.Q. (1958) for a discussion of the origins of the privilege. The author traces the history
of the privilege in the late 1600's and sets forth Wigmore's "History of the Privilege."
Horowitz finds Wigmore's explanation that the emergence of the privilege was a result of the
Court of Star Chamber and the High Commission for Ecclesiastical Causes "inadequate" as the
"source of [the] notion that an accused person should not be required to incriminate himself."
Id. at 124-25. Instead, Horowitz states that the source lies in Talmudic law and that it was
Rabbinic jurisprudence that was one of the "main streams that converged to form the unique
Common law doctrine against self-incrimination." Id. at 125. Horowitz's theory is that the
Jewish law and the legal activity of Edward Coke, as barrister and judge, combined in 17th
century England to develop the doctrine against compulsory self-incrimination." Id. In sum-
mary, he concludes first, that "Jewish law was most probably an indirect, 'subterranean' influ-
ence which seeped into the stream of social thought and ferment in England of the 16th and 17th
centuries. The works of brilliant English Hebraists during this period especially of John Selden
described the Jewish law against self-incrimination;" and, second, "[T]he privilege is not good
legal logic but is a religious principle of humanness and mercy engrafted on the Common law as
it developed greater regard for the Rights of Man." Id. at 143. See also Simcha Mandelbaum,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Anglo-American and Jewish Law, 5 AM. J. COMP.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
vides the individual with protection against the risk of legal criminal liabil-
ity.70
Enforcement of this Constitutional privilege is through the Exclusionary
Rule: where a confession or admission made by an accused is not voluntarily
given, the United States Supreme Court has ruled it inadmissible. This sup-
pression of evidence flows from two separate and distinct Fifth Amendment
guarantees - the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and the due
process clause. The constitutional guarantee of due process requires funda-
mental fairness in government proceedings. In defining "compulsion," the
Court has drawn on due process concepts of "voluntariness." The justifications
for a "voluntary" confession are threefold: first, the use of an involuntary,
coerced admission is intrinsically antithetical to the promise of due process
fairness. Coerced confessions are unfair in that they threaten to produce unre-
liable admissions and potentially convict innocent persons. 7 1 Moreover, they
are the product of methods a civilized society traditionally abhors - tech-
niques that exploit the weak and threaten the autonomy of the individual. Sec-
ond, suppressing involuntary statements creates a strong disincentive for
coercive tactics, thus comporting with the American concept of justice as "an
accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system."'72 Finally, the due process re-
quirement of suppression stems from a "constitutional entitlement to freedom
from unfair judicial procedures. The exclusion of involuntary statements can-
not be a mere future-oriented deterrent measure, for it is an inherent, insepara-
ble element of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. '73 The
suppression of coerced statements is "based on a personal, constitutional ex-
clusionary right" 74 and is not, therefore, subject to the Court's cost-benefit
balancing it reserves for judicially-created exclusionary rules. 7
5
L. 115, 119 (1956) (reaching a similar conclusion that the doctrine protecting against self-in-
crimination existed long before such a doctrine was established in the common law so as to
strongly suggest a link between the doctrine in Jewish law and the common law.).
70. MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 69, at 171.
71. Jewish law shares this concern that there be no coercion of the individual. The practical
effect of the blanket prohibition against confession, even where it is "voluntarily," is that "po-
lice brutality is unheard of because the police authorities gain nothing from a confession, and
the accused loses nothing by such a confession. Torture as a method of investigation is virtually
unheard of in Jewish history. Indeed, who knows - perhaps the obviation of torture as a
judicial tool was the very intention of the biblical Lawgiver and of the rabbinic interpreter."
KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 21, at 19.
72. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
73. James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and
Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C.L. REv. 751, 761 (1989).
74. Id. at 762.
75. The Exclusionary Rule (most frequently referred to in connection with the Fourth
Amendment wherein evidence secured in violation of the Amendment's prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible in a criminal trial of the person whose rights
were violated) has been a source of intense debate since its inception over a hundred years ago
when the United States Supreme Court first excluded evidence in Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616
(1886). At the heart of the debate is the question of whether the application of the exclusionary
rule is too high a price for society to pay for the protection of its constitutional guarantees of
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Suppression of evidence was an integral component of the landmark deci-
sion of Miranda v. Arizona in which the Court added real substance to the
protections of the Fifth Amendment by creating a mechanism to insure that an
accused's statements to the police be given voluntarily. 76 This includes a right
to counsel that attaches to protect the suspect's privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. Until Miranda warnings or a waiver is shown, no evidence
obtained as a result of the interrogation can be used against the defendant.
While Miranda warnings were seen as required to protect the right against
compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, these con-
stitutional underpinnings were cut by the Court in a subsequent decision.
In Michigan v. Tucker, the Court ruled that the Miranda warnings were
procedural safeguards and not constitutional rights themselves. 77 Moreover,
Miranda-based exclusion is to serve primarily deterrence goals, much as it
does in search and seizure cases. The implications of such a decision are far-
reaching: by severing the Constitutional base to the Miranda warnings, the
scope of the Miranda Exclusionary Rule would be significantly narrower than
the Fifth Amendment coerced confession Exclusionary Rule. As a result,
Congress would have the authority to overrule Miranda and implement its
own procedures and it is likely that Miranda would not apply in state
prosecutions.
Indeed, the Miranda holding has been eroded by subsequent Court deci-
sions where it has recognized circumstances in which Miranda warnings are
not required prior to custodial interrogation. These include when public safety
individual liberty and privacy when it allows criminals to go free as a result of illegally seized
evidence. A primary justification for the rule is the "imperative of judicial integrity" and fidel-
ity to the Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). A second justification for the
Exclusionary rule is that it is of constitutional origin so that if the Court were to allow the use of
evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure, it "would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution,
intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action." Weeks v. U.S., 232
U.S. 383, 394 (1914). A third justification for the exclusionary rule is the deterrence rationale.
Today, the Court's position is to see the Rule solely as a "judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrence effect, rather than a per-
sonal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974). Each search and seizure incident becomes subject to a cost-benefit analysis - the loss
of highly probative evidence as opposed to the increased deterrence of police misconduct. Em-
ploying this strictly utilitarian approach, the Court has refused to apply the Rule to those situa-
tions where its deterrent effect would be minimal. This holding has serious implications for if
the Exclusionary Rule is not "part and parcel" of the Fourth Amendment, but merely a remedy
devised by the Court to deter government misconduct, it can be narrowed in scope or even
abolished.
76. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In reaching its decision, the Court discussed
the origins of the privilege against self-incrimination, noting that the roots of the privilege "go
back into ancient times." Id. at 458. The Court noted in n.27 that "[t]hirteenth century com-
mentators found an analogue to the privilege grounded in the Bible. 'To sum up the matter, the
principle that no man is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a divine decree."' Mai-
monides, Judges, Sanhedrin, 18:6.
77. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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is at issue, 78 when the suspect is not aware that he is speaking to a law en-
forcement officer and gives a voluntary statement,79 and when routine ques-
tions are asked of the defendant during booking.80 The Court has further
limited the scope of the Miranda Exclusionary Rule through adoption of an
impeachment exception which allows a prosecutor to use statements at trial to
impeach a defendant's credibility even though the statements had been taken
in violation of Miranda.81 The Court has also allowed use of an accused's
pre-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant,8 2 although it has ruled that to
allow use of post-Miranda silence to impeach trial testimony would be funda-
mentally unfair. 83 The Court has suggested further limits on the reach of Mi-
randa by implying that derivative fruits of the poisonous tree might be
immune from exclusion. 84 While these exceptions pose a serious threat to the
integrity of the individual's rights under the Fifth Amendment, they do not
detract from the fundamental nature of the right itself.
After 30 years, Miranda remains a controversial decision. Critics insist it
should be abolished because it hampers law enforcement efforts at combating
crime. Empirical studies, however, do not support the assertion that Miranda
has had an adverse impact on confession and conviction rates. 85 Still, Mi-
randa imposes social costs. First, it increases the likelihood that potentially
guilty suspects will choose to invoke their right to terminate the interrogation
78. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984). A rape suspect was apprehended by
police in a small grocery store. When the officers frisked the suspect, they found an empty gun
holster. The officer, believing the gun was likely to be on the premises, asked the suspect where
it was before reading the suspect his rights. The suspect answered and the police recovered the
gun. Under Miranda, this questioning was a violation of the suspect's Fifth Amendment right
to be free from self-incrimination. The Court, however, recognized an exception to Miranda
where there is a public safety concern. In this respect, there is a great similarity between the
rationale for the American public safety exception to Miranda and the Jewish Law "emergency"
exception to the Talmudic prohibition against self-incrimination, a similarity which is not lost
on this writer.
79. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 582 (1990). An undercover officer posed as a fellow in-
mate to elicit incriminating statements from an incarcerated suspect. The Court held that the
officer did not have to give the suspect Miranda warnings before questioning because Miranda
applied in the context of a police-controlled environment where compulsion was likely. In this
setting, the suspect had no reason to believe he was facing a custodial interrogation so the idea
of coercion could not play a role in the suspect's willingness to speak.
80. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
81. Harris v. N.Y., 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
82. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
83. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
84. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 299 (1985). The failure to issue Miranda warnings
taints only the statements which flow directly from that failure and absent any government
compulsion, does not taint any subsequent statements secured after a proper Miranda warning is
given.
85. Richard A. Leo, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 86 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOL-
oGY 621, 676-77 (1996). The critics base their arguments on methodologically weak and out-
dated studies and because they were so long ago, they tell nothing about the current effects of
Miranda on police practices. More empirical research would be necessary to evaluate current
impact. In the study conducted by this author, there was no "statistically significant relationship
between a suspect's response to Miranda warnings and his likelihood of being convicted."
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and not cooperate further with police; second, even if a suspect confesses, the
confession may nevertheless be excluded if it was the result of an improper
Miranda warning; and third, Miranda does appear to result in slightly lower
conviction rates. 86 Despite its costs, however, Miranda does offer social ben-
efits. It has led police to treat suspects with greater care, fairness, and re-
straint. Miranda warnings also provide guidelines to police and offer some
limit to their interrogation discretion. 87 And perhaps most important, Miranda
serves as a symbol of justice. It reflects a societal commitment to moral and
constitutional restraints on police practices in custodial questioning. Certainly,
Miranda must remain more than a symbolic gesture to be a genuine safeguard
of individual freedoms and herein lies the tension between reality and illusion
so endemic to American society. While the Burger and Rehnquist Court deci-
sions have chiseled away at Miranda protections, leaving only a promise of
rescue to the person claiming the constitutional privilege,88 the American pub-
lic continues to believe that the Miranda ideal of justice holds some genuine
protection for the potentially innocent victim of police overreaching.
Still, Miranda has endured and not just in America's popular culture.
While it must have pained today's Supreme Court to so hold, it nonetheless
concluded in Dickerson v. United States that Miranda is a constitutional deci-
sion and the criminal defendant's privilege against self-incrimination is a con-
stitutional right.89 In Dickerson, the Court took up the case of a criminal
defendant who moved to suppress statements made to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings
before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion and the Gov-
ernment made an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit, in a divided vote, reversed the
suppression order. It agreed with the District Court's conclusion that the de-
fendant had not received Miranda warnings but it held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
which makes the admissibility of such statements turn solely on whether they
were made voluntarily, was satisfied in this case. The court then concluded
that Miranda was not a constitutional holding and therefore Congress could,
by statute, determine admissibility.90
86. Id. at 677.
87. A year long Newsday study found that the 94% confession rate obtained by Suffolk
County homicide detectives when compared with rates in other states (54% in Maryland and
74% in Illinois) astonished expert Gerald M. Caplan, the former director of the federal govern-
ment's National Institute of Justice. "If I was the police commissioner and there was a 94%
confession rate, I'd get the internal affairs department to see what's wrong." Thomas J. Maier
& Rex Smith, Questionable Procedures Taint Murder Defendants' Confessions, NEWSDAY
(New York), Dec. 3, 1984, at 4.
88. JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE
DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA 78 (Garland Publ'g 1992) (citing Ronald K.L.
Collins, Is Miranda Crumbling? 11 NAT'L L.J. 15 (1989)).
89. Dickerson v. U.S, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
90. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4"h Cir. 1999).
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Thus, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether Miranda
and its progeny was constitutionally-based so as to preclude Congress from
invading its province by legislation. And it did. The Supreme Court held that
Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress could not supersede
legislatively.91 Still, the Court refused to let the decision rest on that basis.
Rather, the Court stated that "[wihether or not we would agree with Miranda's
reasoning and its resulting rule [w]ere we addressing the issue in the first in-
stance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it
now."
9 2
Despite the Court's words of reservation, the result is the same: Miranda
and its progeny have been given constitutional protection. In so doing, the
Court was compelled to consider previous decisions that made exceptions to
the rule. In considering such cases as New York v. Quarles93 and Harris v.
N.Y. ,94 the Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]hese decisions illustrate the princi-
ple - not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule - but that no constitutional
rule is immutable.
'95
It would appear that those who would do away with Miranda as a source
of constitutional rights have been judicially silenced - at least for the foresee-
able future.96 Still, the continuing Miranda debate merely reflects the general
societal debate that exists for a government of law "based upon the dignity and
individuality of the individual soul."'97 The problem is that the same govern-
ment charged with protecting the rights of the individual against unjustified
government intrusions, is simultaneously charged with meeting the needs of
the general society for efficient law enforcement and the promotion of social
order. This is not a simple task nor is there necessarily any agreement about
how to achieve the balance needed between these two opposing interests. But
on one thing there is agreement: American government must uphold the law.
As Justice Brandeis warned in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. U.S.:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Gov-
ernment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher . . . . [I]t
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is conta-
91. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440.
92. Id. at 443.
93. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). Here the Court recognized an exception to Miranda where there
is a public safety concern. See supra note 78.
94. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). An impeachment exception allows a prosecutor to use statements
at trial to impeach a defendant's credibility even though the statements had been taken in viola-
tion of Miranda. See supra note 81.
95. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
96. Most notably, Paul G. Cassell, amicus curiae in Dickerson v. U.S. He has been called
"the man who would undo Miranda v. Arizona." Terry Carter, The Man Who Would Undo
Miranda, 86 A.B.A. J. 44 (2000).
97. Jerome J. Shestack, quoting Justice Brennan in Universal Values and International Law,
supra note 2 at 291.
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gious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy.
98
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, concurring with Brandeis' observation
said: "We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part."
99
For America, then, there can be no "suspension" of the law in times of
social emergency. Rather, the "emergency" would exist for the society should
the government suspend the law. This is because the authority of the govern-
ment is derived from the consent of the people and it exists in their service.' °°
It is precisely this principle of human worth and dignity which infuses the
Constitution and distinguishes American law from all others. American law
places the rights of the individual at its center, rights to which the individual is
entitled to against the government.101
IV. CONCLUSION
It is this unique relationship between the individual and government in
American law which distinguishes the American Fifth Amendment privilege
from the Talmudic prohibition against self-incrimination. While it has been
argued that where "Anglo-American law recognizes a 'privilege,' Jewish law
98. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
99. Id. at 471 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
100. Justice Brennan reflected on the worldwide influence of the Constitution at the Colum-
bia Law School Bicentennial Celebration: "There must be something about the Constitution's
substance that accounts for its worldwide appeal. Three distinct characteristics of American
constitutionality coalesce to distinguish our Constitution as a human rights charter. First, is the
very premise on which the Constitution is based - that government springs from the People.
Second, is the Constitution's enumeration of specific rights that are guaranteed against govern-
ment intrusion. Third, and in my view most important, is the Constitution's implementation of a
mechanism - judicial enforcement - that makes those enumerated rights meaningful."
Quoted in Jerome J. Shestack, Universal Values and International Law, supra note 2, at 287.
101. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 430-31 (2d ed. 1986). "By stating the principle [against self-incrimination] in
the Bill of Rights, which was also a bill of restraints upon government, [the founding fathers]
were once again sounding the tocsin against the dangers of government oppression of the indi-
vidual; and they were voicing their conviction that the right against self-incrimination was a
legitimate defense possessed by every individual against government. Tough-minded revolu-
tionists, the equal of any in history in the art of self-government, they were willing to risk lives
and fortunes in support of their belief that government is but an instrument of man, its sover-
eignty held in subordination to his rights." Moreover, the Constitution was a reminder of their
view that "the citizen is the master of his government, not its subject." This analysis is particu-
larly insightful and useful to our discussion in yet another respect for it highlights most graphi-
cally the essential difference between American and Jewish law. In American law, the "citizen
is the master of his government" because it exists as a creation of the people and derives its
legitimacy from their consent; in Jewish law, the basic assumption is that the laws "emanated
from a command by God. A Jew's basic approach to law is that the law is something that must
be observed in order to keep the Jewish community's bargain with God." Friedell, supra note
60, at 937.
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created a 'natural right."",02 I would suggest that quite the opposite is true.
The Talmudic prohibition against self-incrimination is not a natural right be-
longing to the individual but rather it is the right of the society to protect itself,
although it is by necessity exercised through the individual. Whereas the
American Bill of Rights exists solely to protect the individual from the gov-
ernment and the tyranny of the majority (whatever the "exceptions" might be,
this remains the goal of the Bill of Rights), the Talmudic prohibition serves to
protect society from being corrupted by the individual.
As noted previously, American society is willing "to let criminals go
free"10 3 to protect the basic civil rights of all individuals. Jewish law, on the
other hand, is willing to suspend the rule that protects individuals in times of
emergency to protect the society.1°4 American law allows for a waiver of the
privilege; Jewish law does not.' 0 5 The idea that the individual can choose to
waive a privilege does not necessarily negate the value of that privilege. In-
stead, it serves only to reinforce the importance of the individual in his relation
to the state. In American law, it is the individual who exercises the choice, no
one else.' 0 6 In Jewish law, the society, in effect, chooses for the individual in
that nobody, ever, may confess to a criminal act.
102. Simcha Mandelbaum, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Anglo-American and
Jewish Law, AM. J. CoMP. L. 5, 118 (1956).
103. This rallying cry continues in full force but not necessarily in full effect: The Dickerson
Court cited as one of the disadvantages of the Miranda rule that "statements which may be by
no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his 'rights,' may nonetheless be
excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
104. In sharp contrast to this view of suspension in times of emergency, was Justice Bran-
deis' view that government intrusions upon the privacy of the individual in violation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments were "immaterial" even if the "intrusion was in aid of law en-
forcement. Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the govem-
ment's purposes are beneficent." Moreover, "[t]he greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v. U.S., 277
U.S. at 479 (J. Brandeis, dissenting).
105. LEVY, supra note 101, at 434. The Talmudic rule "was an absolute and could not be
waived or relinquished." The Fifth Amendment right, on the other hand, can be voluntarily
waived. Moreover, the right is not limited to criminal proceedings: it can be asserted in civil
cases, in grand jury proceedings, legislative and administrative hearings, and police stations, if
the testimony he would give might be used against him in a criminal proceeding. In addition,
the Fifth Amendment right can be invoked by any person subpoenaed or otherwise compelled to
testify in any formal proceeding. This means that the right may be invoked by a witness and not
just a criminal defendant.
106. Id. at XV. It is in this sense, therefore, that the American "privilege" is more accurately
a "right." According to Levy, "[a]lthough the legal profession customarily refers to the right
against self-incrimination as a "privilege," I call it a "right" because it is one. Privileges are
concessions granted by the government to its subjects and may be revoked." Continuing, Levy
quotes James Madison: "In the United States, the people, not the government, possible the
absolute sovereignty .... Hence the great and essential rights of the people are secured ... not
by laws paramount to prerogative, but by constitutions paramount to laws." In concluding,
Levy states: "Although the right against self-incrimination originated in England as a common-
law privilege, the Fifth Amendment made it a constitutional right, clothing it with the same
status as other rights, like freedom of religion, that we would never denigrate by describing
them as mere privileges."
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But this is not to diminish in any way the remarkable societal accom-
plishment of the Talmudic prohibition. Despite the few instances in which the
procedural safeguards were suspended, "[t]he Gemara Sages fashioned excep-
tions within the framework of a panoply of safeguards that were both more
comprehensive and more stringent than those of any society before or
after."' 0
7
There is no question that both legal systems are concerned with the invio-
lability of the individual and the rights preserving the integrity and dignity of
the human being. I would suggest that the difference between the two sys-
tems, despite their common celebration of the fundamental freedom of the
individual, lies in the direction in which the obligation between the individual
and the society flows. In American law, the Bill of Rights provisions impose
active obligations on the judges to protect individual liberties, often in seem-
ing contradiction to the general "good" of the society. 0 8 In Jewish law, the
relationship between the individual and society is one of mutual responsibility,
where the individual, as a member of the community, is responsible to the
community and the community is responsible to its members.109 The Tal-
mudic guarantee serves to protect the society as well as the individual from
confessions which might harm them both.
107. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 1027.
108. Bernard Schwartz, How Justice Brennan Changed America, supra note 2, at 33. Justice
Brennan "believed that the Bill of Rights provisions protecting personal liberties imposed ...
active obligations on the judges." See also, Lyle Derniston, Federalism, The "Great Design,"
and the Ends of Government, supra note 2, at 264 for a discussion of Justice Brennan's under-
standing of the American federalist system. Harvard law professor Laurence H. Tribe summa-
rized Brennan's beliefs in the constitutional scheme as flowing from "an elementary
constitutional truth, the truth that human beings are, of course, the intended beneficiaries of our
constitutional scheme." Id.
109. Jewish society adopts a jurisprudence that emphasizes obligations and relationships - it
is a communitarian spirit of the law. The emphasis is on responsibility and relationships rather
than on individual rights. Friedell, supra note 60, at 942-44.
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